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What Sensory Signals are About
Crawford L. Elder
In ‘Of Sensory Systems and the “Aboutness” of Mental States’, Kathleen Akins (1996) argues
against what she calls ‘the traditional view’ about sensory systems, according to which they are detectors
of features in the environment outside the organism. As an antidote, she considers the case of
thermoreception, a system whose sensors send signals about how things stand with themselves and their
immediate dermal surround (a ‘narcissistic’ sensory system); and she closes by suggesting that the signals
from many sensory systems may not in any familiar sense be about anything at all. Her presentation of
the issues, however, overlooks resources available to ‘the traditional view’—or so I shall argue.
Akins’s own thumbnail sketch of what is wrong with the traditional view is that it asks, concerning a
given sensory system, ‘what is it detecting?’, when we should instead be asking ‘what is it doing?’ (352).
Her point is that on the traditional view the function of a sensory system—what it's ‘for’—is to detect or
indicate (values of) features of the outside environment. But at least on one version of the traditional
view—namely Ruth Millikan’s—this would never be the sole or main proper function of a sensory system.
(Akins does not list Millikan as a traditionalist, but Millikan fits squarely Akins’s description of them, since
she believes in a naturalistic theory of aboutness and thinks it should begin with the senses.) For Millikan
(1989, 1993), the proper function of a sensory system is in the first instance enabling behavioural
systems—in the simplest case, motor routines—to perform their proper function. This they do, roughly, by
switching on and steering the behavioural routines. Where features of the outside environment come in is
as Normal (= assumed-by-the-design) conditions for the successful performance of the sensory system's
proper function. That is, the only strategy for switching on and steering that is simple enough for evolution
to have hit upon it, and reliable enough for evolution to have liked it, is a strategy which gears the steering
to (values of) features of the outside environment.
But as soon as one starts fleshing out the details of this story, one notices that they are probably
quite different in the case of thermoreception from how they are with ‘distance’ senses such as vision and
olfaction--a point which Akins overlooks. It's likely that a proper function (maybe the proper function) of

the thermoreceptive system is to steer motor routines so as to ward off freezing and cooking of the skin.
The only strategy for steering here which has the requisite combination of simplicity and reliability, would
be one which gears the steering to the severity of the threat presently posed to the area of skin where the
thermoreceptor itself is. This is exactly the feature to which thermoreceptors do respond, on Akins’s own
account. (Akins describes two different types of thermoreceptors, each characterized by two patterns of
response to ambient temperature, but sums by saying ‘the system as a whole constitutes one solution to
man's various thermal needs--that he be warned when thermal damage is occurring or before it is likely to
occur, when temperatures are likely to have specific consequences, and so on’ (350).) And yes, severity
of threat is only just barely a feature of the outside environment: it is a feature of the environment that
touches the skin, and is very close to the thermoreceptors. It is entirely true then that the response-activity
of thermoreceptors is ‘narcissistic’.
Concerning other sensory systems and capacities, however, it is plausible to attribute proper
functions of steering behaviour in more indirect ways. Shape recognition and distance perception are the
most obvious examples, but I will focus on the more challenging examples of colour vision and olfaction.
Colour vision, let us suppose, responds to something in the objects that surround the organism that can
serve usefully to steer that organism’s behaviour. But does it do this by indicating where particular colours
are to be found? Does the system’s testimony, that is, that colour C is to be found not only here but there,
or is present again just as it was a moment ago, attune the organism to useful objective samenesses in the
organism’s surroundings?

The idea seems implausible, since a whole rabble of different surface

reflectance profiles will present the same hue, and a coloured light of single wavelength will do so as well.
But, as Austen Clark (forthcoming: Ch. 6) has pointed out, colour vision’s testimony as to where
differences lie tells vastly more reliably, and more usefully, about the objects that surround the organism.
It attunes the organism to edges, places where one surface stops and another begins, that would be
undetectable to black-and-white vision. It can steer a motor routine to reach for a banana that would
otherwise remain indiscernible against the jungle background. It can signal to the organism that the same
object extends beyond a narrow obstructing object both to the right and the left—and hence that a tail-like
appendage is connected to a head with fangs bared. Finally, colour vision can render the organism
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sensitive to multi-dimensional complexes of shape and chromatic contrast, with the result that behaviour
can be cued to the presence of bird wings with that pattern, or predator coats with those spots, across a
wide variety of lighting conditions. So it can trigger the organism to do what it has learned to do, or has
been hard wired to do, in the presence of just that other species. And note that the edges and contrast
patterns which colour vision thus works by tracking are all features of objects out there around the
organism, and not of the organism itself. Colour vision is not narcissistic —but more on this in a moment.
What about olfaction? If we generalize the points just made about colour vision, I think parallel
points will appear plausible concerning olfaction as well. Colour vision works by signaling where objects in
the environment begin and leave off and crop up again, both across space and time. It signals these things
sometimes of individual objects, and sometimes of objects as embodiments of a kind—sometimes signaling,
for example, “that kind of bird wing again”. Olfaction, too, apparently does one of its jobs by signaling the
reappearance of this or that individual conspecific animal—for in some species there are scent glands
apparently selected precisely for enabling such reidentification. It is plausible that olfaction discharges
other proper functions by signaling the presence of this or that kind, e.g. of plant or insect or prey. For in
doing so it can trigger appropriate behaviour which natural selection has hard wired into the organism’s
repertoire, or can bring to bear information which the individual organism has learned from previous
encounters with the kind (thus guiding behaviour now), or can even enable the acquisition of more such
information (thus guiding future behaviour).
But it also is likely that olfaction sometimes works in a way colour vision typically does not.
Olfaction may work by telling not just what is the same again and what different, in the objects that
surround its owner, but by telling, of one such object, what state it is in. Surely part of what olfaction was
selected for was triggering avoidance of foods that are rotten or of conspecifics that are ill. In these cases,
no less than in those where olfaction signals bare sameness and difference, it works by signaling matters
out there in the environing objects, not features of its host. The nose is no narcissist.
But perhaps the suggestion of narcissism cannot be dismissed merely by observing that olfaction—
or, for that matter, colour vision—gears its influence over behaviour to features and samenesses located
out there in the objects. Perhaps both olfaction and colour vision work by signaling properties out there in
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the surrounding objects, but “response-dependent” properties. Perhaps, for example, the sensation in
humans of red signals the presence of a dispositional property, namely the capacity to elicit in humans the
sensation of red. In that case colour vision would still be in the interesting sense “narcissistic”. The
properties it signals would be anthropocentric, and strangely gerrymandered from a physical point of vie w.
The signaling of such properties wold tell a lot more about us than about objects.
What I have maintained, however, is that the crucial question is how colour vision bestows selective
advantage—what explains the fact that tugs and pulls which it administered (directly or indirectly) to the
steering wheel of our ancestors’ motor systems steered them, on the occasions decisive in evolution, in
ways that helped them. That colour vision steered the motor systems towards or away from
anthropocentric, gerrymandered reflectance properties does not explain why its steerings helped those
ancestors. For there is no payoff in an organism’s orienting itself well in relation to such properties. Even
facing such properties squarely and saluting cannot do anything for (or against) the organism’s physical or
reproductive needs. Or, to be precise, if organisms did profit by having the direction of their motor routines
attuned to the presence of the gerrymandered properties, they profited indirectly: just to the extent that,
and just because, they thereby were attuned to edges and repeating contrast patterns genuinely there in
the objects that surrounded them. Colour vision is not narcissistic in any sense.
Narcissism has a deservedly bad name, and I am glad to conclude that many of our sensory
systems are innocent of the charge.
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